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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CREDIT INDUSTRIAL LOAN PLAN, 
a corporation, 
Appellwnt, 
-vs.-
PURL F. PETERSON and CARMA 
. PETERSON, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
8162 
The above named appellant, plaintiff in the DiHtrif't 
Court, appeals from the judgment entered in this eamw 
by that court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed suit in the Third Judicial Dist rid 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on a 
promissory note and chattel mortgage eX<'<"utrd hy thr 
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defendants and delivered to plaintiff evidencing a loan 
of money by plaintiff to defendants. Copies of the note 
and mortgage attached to plaintiff's complaint show that 
said note was executed by the defendants on May 31, 
1952 whereby they agreed to pay to the plaintiff the sum 
of $1,376.88 in twenty-four consecutive monthly install-
ments of $57.37 each, beginning July 12, 1952. The mort-
gage provided that the proceeds of any sale made pur-
suant either to the foreclosure of the mortgage or by 
notice and sale according to law would be applied first 
to the payment of charges and then to the payment of 
the principal balance due on nwrtgagor's note in accord-
ance with its terms, and that the mortgagor would be 
liable for any deficiency. Said defendants were in de-
fault when the complaint was filed. Plaintiff is a duly 
licensed and qualified Industrial Loan Corporation under 
Title 7, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Defendants answered alleging that the interest 
charged by plaintiff on said loan was in excess of that al-
lowed by 15-1-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and that 
therefore said note and mortgage were void for usury. 
Defendants also counterclaimed for judgment against 
plaintiff in the amount of t320.48, which amount defend-
ants had paid to plaintiff on said loan. 
The matter came on for pretrial hearing on Decem-
ber 30, 1953 before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of 
the Judges of the Third District Court. At said hearing 
the parties stipulated that the interest charged by the 
plaintiff on said loan "\vas in excess of ten percent per 
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anntun simple interest as allowed by 15-1-2, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. Defendants thereupon moved for a dis-
missal of plaintiff's complaint and for summary judg-
ment against plaintiff in accordance with defendants' 
counterclaim on the ground that the loan in question could 
not be made under the Industrial Loan Act (Title 7, 
Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953) because the final 
payment on said loan as shown by the face of the note 
was not due until June 12, 1954, a longer period of time 
than two years from the date of making the loan, to-wit, 
twelve days, and therefore offends against section 7-8-5 
(1) of said Act. The trial court granted defendants' mo-
tions and entered judgment in the following terms on 
F·ebruary 8, 1954: 
"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED as follows, to-wit: 
1. The complaint of the plaintiff filed herein 
is dismissed with prejudice on the grounds of 
'no cause of action.' 
2. Judgment be entered against the plaintiff 
in favor of the defendants in the sum of Three 
hundred twenty and 48/100 dollars. 
3. The chattel mortgage given by defendants 
in favor of plaintiff dated 31 ~fay 1952 is hereby 
declared null and void and of no effect and any 
lien or cloud upon the title to any and all of the 
property described in said chattel mortgage re-
sulting from said chattel mortgage is hereby re-
moved." 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal, together with 
defendants' Waiver of Cost Bond, on March 6, 1954. 
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The sole question sub1nitted by this appeal is one 
of the interpretation of the Industrial Loan Act known 
as Title 7, Chapter 8, Utah Code Annotated 1953 and may 
be stated as follows : "Do the provisions of this Act pro-
hibit a corporation duly licensed to do business under and 
by virtue of said Act from making a loan of money for 
a period longer than two years where such loan has been 
made on personal security of the borrower, and in this 
case a promissory note secured by a mortgage; said 
mortgage providing for the usual procedure, namely, that 
upon sale of the property recited in the mortgage that if 
the proceeds are not sufficient to satisfy the unpaid bal-
ance of said note, then and in that event the n1ortgagor 
shall he liruble for the deficiency." This plaintiff and 
appellant contends that it has a right to make such a 
loan under said Act in excess of two years where said 
loan is evidenced by a promissory note secured by a 
mortgage; further that the trial court erred in granting 
defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judg-
ment thereby in ·substance holding that under the pro-
visions of said Act industrial loan corporations do not 
have the power to make loans on personal security for 
a period in excess of two years. (Agreed Statement of 
Record on Appeal pursuant to Rule 75 (o), U.R.C.P.) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN ACT PROHIBITS 
THE MAKING OF LOANS SECURED BY CHATTEL MORT-
GAGES FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN TWO YEARS. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
THAT THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN ACT PROHIBITS 
THE MAKING OF LOANS SECURED BY CHATTEL MORT-
GAGES FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN TWO YEARS. 
1. PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL LOAN 
ACT. 
The Utah Industrial Loan Act grants certain powers 
to corporations who qualify and are licensed under that 
Act. Particularly material to the issue presented by this 
appeal are the following provisions (citations herein re-
fer to Utah Code Annotated 1953 unless otherwise 
stated) : 
"7 -8-3. General Powers. - Every industrial 
loan corporation shall have power: 
(1) To loan money on the personal under-
taking of the borrower and other persons, or on 
personal security, or otherwise, and to deduct 
interest thereon in advance at the rate of one 
per cent or less of the face of such loan per month, 
*** 
(2) To issue and sell certificates for the 
payment of money at any time, either fixed or 
uncertain, and to receive payments therefor in 
installments or otherwise, with or without allow-
ance of interest on such installments; provided, 
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that nothing herein shall he construed to author-
ize such corporations to receive deposits or to cre-
ate any liability due on de1nand. The certificates 
issued by any such corporation shall he approved 
as to form by the bank commissioner, and shall 
bear upon the face of the instrument the words, 
'This is not a certificate of deposit.' 
7-8-5. Certain acts forbidden. - No such 
corporation shall: 
(1) Make any loan on the security of makers, 
co-m.akers, ilndorsers, sureties or guarantors for 
a longer period than two years from the· date 
thereof. 
(2) Hold at any one time the obligation or 
obligations of any one person aggregating more 
than two per cent of the amount of its paid up 
capital and surplus. 
(3) Make any loan or discount on the se-
curity of its own capital stock, or be the purchaser 
or holder of any such shares, unless the taking of 
such security or such purchase shall be necessary 
to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted 
in good faith, or unless such purchase is made up-
on sale for delinquent assessments. Stock so pur-
chased or acquired shall be sold within ninety 
days from the time of its purchase or acquisition. 
( 4) Make any loan or discount, directly or 
indirectly, to any director, officer or employee 
of such corporation. 
( 5) Have outstanding at any time its certi-
ficates or other evidences of debt in an aggregate 
sum in excess of five times the aggregate amount 
of its paid up capital and surplus. 
() 
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( 6) Exact a surrender charge on certificates 
issued by it. 
7-8-6. Reserve required. -Every such cor-
poration shall at all times maintain and have on 
hand a reserve in an ainount equal to five per cent 
of its liabilities on outstanding certificates. 
7-8-7. Reports to bank commissioner. -
Every industrial loan corporation shall make to 
and file with the bank commissioner on or before 
the 31st day of J'anuary of each year, according 
to forms prescribed by him, a report verified by 
the president, manager or treasurer, and attest-
ed by at least two directors, showing the true 
condition of the corporation as of the preceding 
December 31, and shall make and file special re-
ports when and as called for by the commission-
er." (Emphasis added.) 
It seems clear that the provisions of 7-8-3 (1) above 
quoted authorize the making of three types of loans, 
classified on the basis of the type of security involved: 
( 1) the personal undertaking of the borrower and other 
persons ; ( 2) or on personal security; ( 3) or otherwise. 
The language and punctuation used make this conclusion 
inescapable. It is the position of this appellant that the 
two year time limitation imposed by 7-8-5 (1) as set forth 
above applies only to the first type of loans, and not to 
the other two. 
A brief review of the history of the Utah Industrial 
Loan Act strongly supports this posi tio·n. On March 12, 
1925 the Legislature of the State of Utah passed an act 
defining industrial loan companies and providing for 
their incorporation (Laws of Utah 1925, Chapter 116). 
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This act became effective 1\Iarch 21, 1925 and provided 
in part as follows: 
"Section 4. Powers - fees - approval of 
bank commissioner. EYery corporation under the 
provisions of this act shall have power : 
(a) To loan money on the personal wnder-
takilng of the borrower and other persons, or on 
personal security, or otherwise. * * *" (emphasis 
added.) 
As may be seen the wording of the present law in this 
respect is identical with the wording of the original1925 
Act. 
The 1925 Act contained no limitations as to the 
length of loans to be made under its provisions. 
On March 10, 1927 the Legislature amended the 
1925 Act and added new sections which imposed certain 
limitations and restrictions on the operations of indus-
trial loan companies (Laws of Utah 1927, Chapter 50). 
This Act !became effective May 10, 1927 and provided 
insofar as is material to the issues herein involved as fol-
lows: 
"Sec. 4X. Restrictions. No corporation, un-
der the prov:i:sions of this Act, shall : 
(a) Make any loan on the security of mak-
ers, co-make:rs, endorsers, sureties or guarantors 
for a longer period than one year from the date 
thereof. 
(b) Hold at any one time the primary obli-
gation or obligations of any person, firm, or cor-
poration for more than two per cent of the amount 
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of the paid-up capital and surplus of such indus-
trial loan company. 
(c) Make any loan or discount on the se-
curity of its own capital stock, or be the purchaser 
or holder of any such shares unless such security 
or purchase shall be necessary to prevent loss up-
on a debt previously contracted in good faith. 
Stock so purchased or acquired shall be sold or 
otherwise disposed of within ninety days from the 
time of its purchase or acquisition. 
(d) 1fake any loan or discount, directly or 
indirectly to any director, officer or employee of 
such corporation. 
(e) Have outstanding at any time its invest-
ment certificates or other evidence of debt, in an 
aggregate sum in excess of five times the aggre-
gate amount of its paid-up capital and surplus. 
(f) Exact a surrender charge on investment 
certificates issued by the corporation." (Emphasis 
added.) 
As can he seen the 1927 amendment added the re-
strictions, including a time limit on certain loans made 
under the Industrial Loan Act, which are now in the 
present act as 7-8-5, with the exception that the period 
of limitation was only one year. 
The 1933 code revision deleted certain preliminary 
sections from the 1925 Act, none of which sections are 
material to the issues herein involved. 
On January 26, 1939 the Legislature amended the 
time restriction enacted in 1927 as set forth above by ex-
tending the one year limitation to two years, changing 
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that section to the way it reads today. 
It is clear from a review of the history of this Act 
and its amendments that the time limitation imposed by 
the 1927 amendment applies not to all loans made by in-
dustrial loan corporations, but that said limitation ap-
plies only to loans made on the security of makers, co-
makers, endorsers, sureties or gttarantors. If it had been 
the intent of the Legislature to apply the time limitation 
to all loans it would be a very simple matter to so state. 
If such had been the legislative intent obviously the re-
strictive amendment would have read: "No such corpo-
ration shall make any loan for a longer period than two 
years from the date thereof." 
It is an elementary principle of statutory construC-
tion that all words contained in a statute are· to be given 
meaning. The construction as contended for by the re-
spondents and adopted by the trial court would strip 
the qualifying words of makers, comakers, endorsers, 
sureties or guarantors of any meaning whatsoever. This 
Court should be reluctant to construe the statute in ques-
tion in a manner which would in effect delete these words 
from the provision. 
2. THE PURPOSE OF THE TWO YEAR LIMITATION. 
When the purpose of the two year limitation is ex-
amined into it becomes even more obvious that the limita-
tion does not apply to loans like the one in the instant 
case. 
Under the Utah Industrial Loan Act an industrial 
10 
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loan company is in effect an industrial bank, substan-
tially similar to industrial banks in many other states, 
although in Utah such companies may not use the word 
ba.nk in their nmnes (7-3-57), nor can their investment 
certificates be referred to as deposits or savings accounts 
7-8-3 (2) ). However, under the Utah Act all industrial 
loan companies are entitled to issue and sell investment 
certificates to the public and to pay interest thereon 
just as any bank or trust company accepts savings de-
posits and pays a stipulated rate of interest thereon. 
Thus an industrial loan company becomes a quasi-public 
institution. On December 31, 1953 there were over 2.8 
million dollars of such monies from the public invested 
in various Utah industrial loan companies (Biennial Re-
port of the Bank Commissioner June 30, 1954). These 
savings are owned by thousands of individuals and for 
their protection the Bank Commissioner, pursuant to 
statute, (7-8-7) examines the companies involved with 
the same care as he examines banks holding depositors' 
monies. 
It should be noted that the re,strictions on the opera-
tions of industrial loan companies set forth in section 
7-8-5 were not contained in the original 1925 Act, but 
were added later. A sirnple reading of those six restric-
tions will show that they are all obviously directed to the 
protection and safe guarding of the funds of the holders 
of investment certificates since they restrict the amount 
that might be loaned to one person, prohibit loans on 
the security of the company's own stock, etc. Sections 
7-8-6 and 7-8-7 contain additional requirements for the 
11 
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further protection of the public investor. 
With this purpo·se (to protect the funds invested 
by the public) in mind, it then is very clear that the two 
year limitation was intended to apply only to those loans 
which had no security other than the signature of makers, 
co-makers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors. Obviously 
the Legrslature considered that such loans were too poor 
a risk for a period longer than two years, but where 
other security was obtained the risk was not as great, 
and loans for a longer period might be justified. 
Does the construction of the two year provision 
adopted by the trial court harmonize with this obvious 
intent and purpose of the Legislature 1 On the contrary, 
it flies in the teeth of that expressed intent. The trial 
court in effect says all industrial loans are subject to the 
two year limit. If the Legislature had intended to so 
restrict the making of all industrial loans it would have 
said so. But instead, the Legislature only limited loans 
made on signatures. The language used unquestionally 
shows that the purpose was to protect the public in-
vestors by limiting the time period of signature or co-
signor loans. 
It rs elementary that effect must if possible he given 
to every word of a statute and that the statute must be 
read as a whole. 
It cannot be questioned that by the original act these 
companies were authorized to take interest in advance 
on loans made either on "the personal undertaking of the 
12 
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borrower and other persons, or on personal security, 
or otherwise ***." The original act allowed a deduction 
of intere-st at the rate of 12% of the face of the loan. 
By the 1927 amendment, this was changed so as to permit 
the deduction of interest in advance at the rate of 1% 
per month or less of the face of the loan and the, time 
limitation was impos'ed with respect to loans on "the 
security of makers, co-makers, endorsers, sureties or 
guarantors" limiting such loans to one year from the 
date thereof. 
This limitation was made in an added section and 
not by an amendment to the section which authorized 
loaning money and did not include directly or by impli-
cation the words "or on personal se-curity, or otherwise." 
The 1939 amendment extended this time limitation 
with respect to loans on the security of the makers, etc. 
to two years and again took no account of loans "on per-
sonal security, or otherwise." 
As it stands therefore, there is an express authori-
zation for the deduction in advance of interest on all 
loans authoriz'ed to be made by such companies and there 
is a time limitation only with respect to signature loans. 
To hold otherwise is to ignore the language which has 
been in the statute fro1n the beginning with respect to 
loans on personal s'ecuri ty or otherwise. 
The loan in the instant case was secured by a chattel 
mortgage in writing signed by both borrowers and conse-
quently is not subject to the two year limitation. 
13 
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3. PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS. 
Although this Court has considered the provisions 
of the Utah Industrial Loan Act in at least two previous 
cases (People's Finance wnd Thrift Company v. Varney, 
75 Utah 355, 285 Pac. 304; Seaboard Finarnce Compamy v. 
Wahlen, ______ Utah ______ , 260 P. 2d 556) the particular issue 
herein involved has never been discussed. However, a 
time limitation on loans made on the security of makers, 
co-makers, indorsers, sureties, and guarantors has been 
part of the Utah Act since 1927. During that twenty-
seven year period industrial loan companies have been 
in business n1aking loans secured by mortgages for peri-
ods longer than the limitation period on signature and 
co-signer loans. Companies licensed and operating under 
the Utah Act have consistently made loans ·secured by 
first and second real estate mortgages for periods of 
several times the two year period which the law pre-
scribes for signature and co-signer loans. 
This interpretation has never been questioned. As 
recently as November 19, 1953 the Bank Commissioner 
rendered a written opinion on this point as follows: 
"Mr. E. W. Rasmussen 
Secretary-Treasurer 
Home Acceptance Corporation 
837 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Rasmussen: 
Reference is made to our telephone conversation 
of November 17 and your letter of same date re-
garding the making of industrial loans for a peri-
14 
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od longer than two years. 
It is the opinion of this department that it is the 
intent of the Industrial Loan Act to permit loans 
made upon the personal undertaking of a borrow-
er and secured otherwise than the signature of 
the maker, comaker, endorsers, sureties, or guar-
antors, to be made for a longer term than two 
years though prohibiting the making of loans for 
a longer than two years period where made solely 
upon the security of such signatures. 
Per'sonal regards. 
Yours very truly 
( s) Louis S. Leatham" 
Bank Commissioner 
The writer of a recent note involving finance legis-
lation has reached the same conclusion. (Greene, Un-
licensed and Licensed Usury in Utah, 4 Utah Law Review 
67, 83, note 122). 
The trial court's decision is without ba·sis in reason, 
logic, or precedent, -and should be reversed. 
4. STATUTES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
The classification of loans on the basis of security 
for regulatory purposes is not unusual, nor is it exclu-
sive with the Utah Legislature. rrhe Oregon Industrial 
Loan Act is an excellent example of that fact inasmuch 
as its wording and history closely parallels the Utah 
Act. 
In 1925 the Oregon Legislature enacted an Industrial 
Loan Act which provided in part as follows ( G0neral 
Laws of Oregon, 1925, Chapter 303): 
15 
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"Section 5. Powers. Every corporation 
under the provisions of this act shall have power: 
To loan money on personal security, or other-
wise, and to deduct interest therefor in advance 
*** 
"Section 6. Res1trictions. No corporation 
under the provisions of this act shall : 
(a) Make any lo:an on the security of 
makers, co-makers, indorsers, sureties or guaran-
tors, for a longer period than one year from the 
date thereof. 
(b) ***" 
In 1929 the Oregon Act was amended (General Laws 
of Oregon 1929, Chapter 325) and the restrictions section 
was changed to read as follows : 
"Section 6. Restrictions. No corporation 
under the provisions of this act shall : 
(a) Make any loan on the sole security of 
makers, comakers, indorsers, sureties or guaran-
tors for a longer period than one year from the 
date thereof. 
(b) ~!fake any loans secured by chattel mort-
gage for a longer period than two years from the 
date thereof." 
In 1931 the Oregon Act was further amended to ex-
tend the limitation on loans on the sole security of makers, 
comakers, etc. from one year to eighteen months. 
As can be seen from this Oregon Act loans secured 
by chattel mortgages were considered to he a distinct 
and separate type from loans made on the security of 
16 
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makers, cmnakers, etc. The conclusion is inescapable 
that such different categories are contemplated by the 
Utah A0t and that the two year limitation does not apply 
to loans secured by chattel mortgage. 
Several states have industrial loan laws wherein a 
time limit is imposed upon all loans made under the 
provisions of the Act except certain specified loans. Ex-
amples of this type statute are (a) Connecticut (General 
Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1949, Section 5865) 
wherein industrial hanks may loan money for any period 
not exceeding thirty -six months, except that loans se-
cured by mortgage of real estate may be made for any 
period not exceeding thirty years; (b) Maine (Revised 
Statutes of Maine 1944, Chapter 55, Section 186), where-
in industrial banks are prohibited from making any loan 
for a period longer than two years except in the case 
of loans that are eligible for insurance under the National 
Housing Act; and (c) New York (1\!IcKinney's Consoli-
dated Laws of New York Annotated, Book 4, Part 2, 
Section 294) wherein industrial banks are prohibited 
from making any loan for a period longer than twenty-
four months from the date thereof, except loans secured 
by real estate mortgage. 
The Industrial Loan Act of the State of Washing-
ton (Remington's Revised Statutes of Washington 1941 
Supplement) contains a restriction clause identical with 
that of the Utah Act, as follows: 
"Section 3862.-9, Restrietions on powers ---
Prohibited loans, discounts, investments, depo~i t~, 
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pledges, etc. No corporation under the provisions 
of this act shall : 
(a) 1\1:ake any loan, on security of 1nakers, 
comakers, endorsers, sureties or guarantors, for a 
longer period than two years from the date there-
of. 
(b)***" 
An example of an industrial loan statute which 
places a time limit on all industrial loans, regardless of 
the type of security, may be found in Tennessee· (Williams 
Tennessee Code Anno~tated, Volume 4, 1941 Replace-
ment, 1952 pocket supplement): 
"Section 6720.7. Corporate powers. Every 
corporation formed or qualified under the provi-
·sion:s of this act shall *** have the following 
powers ***: 
(a) *** 
(f) To lend nwney on the personal under-
taking of a borrower or other person with or with-
out security***. 
"Se0tion 6720.10. Prohibited acts. - No in-
dustrialloan and thrift cmnpany shall: 
(a) *** 
('b) Make any loan under the provision of 
this act for a longer period th·an two years from 
the date thereof." (emphasis added.) 
To ~agre·e with respondents' argument in this matter 
and to affirm the trial court's action this Court must 
construe section 7-8-5, Subsection (1) of the Utah Act 
as though it were worded as the Tennessee Act quoted 
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above. To do this the Court must, by judicial legislation, 
dele,te from the Utah Act the words "on the security of 
makers, comakers, indorsers, sureties or guarantors." 
It is submitted that the Court cannot reasonably or justi-
fiably indulge in such judicial legislation and thereby 
invalidate existing contract rights totaling million1s of 
dollars. 
The Utah Legislature must have intended something 
by including those words in the two year limitation pro-
vision. We submit that what was intended by the inclu-
sion of those words was that the limitation provision 
was not to apply to loans secured by chattel mortgages 
or other security, but was t<? apply only to loans secured 
by signature of the maker or other persons. The fact 
that statutes from other states, notably Washington and 
Oregon, contained substantially identical wording, is 
further proof that the included words were not merely 
the whim and caprice of the Utah Legislature, but were 
in fact inserted for the purpose stated above. 
As is shown by the· Agreed Statement of Record in 
this matter the loan in this case was secured by a chattel 
mortgage executed by the respondents. Consequently 
this loan made on the security of makers, comakers, en-
dorsers, sureties or guarantors, but rather it is a loan 
made on the security of a ehattel mortgage, and, there-
fore, it is not within the two year limitation of Sections 
7-8-5, Subsection ( 1). 
As has been set forth above there is substantial legis-
lative history and precedent for classifying industrial 
19 
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loans on the basis of the type security involved. Legis-
latures of certain states have seen fit to place time. limits 
on all types of industrial loans. Legislatures of certain 
other states have seen fit to place time limits only on 
certain types of indus1trial loans. Utah is in the latter 
category and the Legistature ha:s not expressed an intent 
to place a limitation on industrial loans secured by 
chattel mortgages. If the Utah Legislature had desired 
to place such a limitation on all industrial loans it could 
have very simply done so with simple, clear and precise 
language as described above. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT. 
As was set forth in the Staten1ent of Faets, supra, 
the note ·and chattel mortgage involved in the instant 
case were executed by respondents on May 31, 1952 and 
called for repayment in twenty-four equal monthly in-
stallments beginning July 12, 1952. Consequently the last 
installment would be due June 12, 1954 or 12 days longer 
than two years from the date of execution. 
The question of charging interest on the loan in 'ad-
vance is not an issue in this appeal, it being resolved by 
this Court in the case of Seaboard Finance Company v. 
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vVahlen, supra. Nor is the computation of interest in-
volved in this appeal. The interest charged on the inS'tant 
loan was computed on the basis of twenty-four month~s. 
The sole basis for the trial court's dedsion was that the 
final payment was not due until 12 days a£ter two years 
from making the lo1an. It was not contended that re-
spondents were charged interest for those 12 days, but 
only that since the due date for payments was moved up 
from the last of the month to the 12th of the month that 
the loan was ipso facto not within the provisions of the 
Industrial Loan Act. The error of this decision has been 
pointed out in Point I of this 'argument. 
As a practical matter of doing business in making 
loans the monthly due date is set after consultation with 
the borrower, and such date is arranged to correspond 
with the borrower's pay day or to otherwise meet his con-
venience. This flexibility is 'a gratuity to the borrower, 
and, far fron1 being a detriment to him, is in fact a con-
siderable convenience and advantage to him. 
It was stipulated that the interest charged on the 
instant loan was in excess of the ten percent simple inter-
es~t allowed by the general interest statute of the state 
(15-1-2). Consequently if the loan in question is not 
properly within the provisions of the Utah Industrial 
Loan Act and subject to the rates therein authorized, 
the loan is usurious, resulting in complete forfeiture of 
both principal and interest (15-1-7). This w'as the con-
clusion reached by the trial court. 
Is this result war ran ted under the facts and the law~ 
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We think not. 
This Court has s~aid that a corrupt and unlawful 
intent must 'be present to render 'a transaction usurious. 
Fisher v. Adamson, 47 Utah 3, 151 Pac. 351; Cobb v. 
Hartenstein, 4 7 Utah 17 4, 152 Pac. 424. Clearly there 
can be no such intent in the instant case. Usury laws 
are for ~the protection of the borrower, not to punish the 
lender. Rospigliosi v Glenallen Mining Co., 69 Utah 41, 
2,52 Pac. 276. The 12 days upon which the trial court 
based its decision in no way harmed or was detrimental 
to the borrowers, but the result of the trial court's de-
cision is the extreme penalty of forfeiture to appellant. 
It i'S a well established principle that the law frowns 
on pen1alties and forfeitures. Yet the result of the trial 
court's decision is forfeiture of a $1300.00 loan because 
of 12 days for which no interest was charged, and under 
a statute which, properly construed, places no time limit 
on the type of loan herein involved. 
The trial court erred in granting respondents' mo~ 
tion to dismiss bec1ause that motion was based upon an 
erroneous interpretati'on of the provisions of the statute. 
The trial crourt also erred in granting respondents' mo-
tion for 'summary judgment because it was based on the 
same mistake of law. The uction of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 7-8-5 ( 1) does not apply to loans made upon 
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the security of chattel mortgages executed by the borrow-
er. 
The result of the trial court's decision is forfeiture 
and is not necessary or proper. It results from a strained, 
unrealistic, and erroneous application of the statute and 
indeed constitutes unwarranted and highly improper 
judicial legislation. 
~rhe trial court's order dismis'Sing appellant's com-
plaint should be reversed and the judgment entered 
against appellant should be vacated and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and 
NATHAN J. FULLMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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